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The Making of a Law Teacher 
Odeana R. Nealt 
At a meeting of the Northeast Corridor l in October, 1990, Paulette 
CaldwelF wondered aloud whether black women law teachers might be 
carrying on a cultural tradition of teaching.3 Her inquiry struck a chord 
with me that I hadn't heard in a long time. When I was very young, I 
wanted to be a teacher. I tutored younger children when I was in ele-
mentary school and commandeered a math class in junior high school 
after the teacher challenged me to "get up here and teach the class if you 
think you can do it better than I can." I thought I could and I still think 
I did. 
In spite of these early experiences, I always laughed when my father 
mentioned that I should think about teaching, partly because I saw aca-
demics as social parasites-people who went to school forever without 
doing anything to make the world a better plac~and partly because I 
could not imagine myself in the world of the academics who taught me in 
college-men (all of them) who considered their place in the universe 
second only to the sun. But I think that I was also having trouble envi-
sioning myself as one of the smart people. 
t Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. This article is dedicated to the 
memory of my father, Gary D. Neal, who thought I'd be happy if I were teaching. He was 
right. I would like to thank Taunya Lovell Banks, Louise Hope Lewis, and Gerald Frog for 
their comments on an earlier version of this article, as well as Keith B. Churchwell, who never 
doubted my intelligence, even when I did. 
I The Northeast Corridor is an organization comprised of African-American women who are 
law teachers. Although the group began as an effort to bring together women who taught in 
schools or lived on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor line (from Boston to Washington, D.C.), 
women from throughout the country now attend meetings reguIarly. 
2 Professor, New York University School of Law. 
3 Discriminatory laws and economic deprivations in the United States have resulted in African-
American career options being severely limited throughout history. For example, in 1940 over 
half of the African-American population had no more than eight years of education and 62% 
of those who worked did so in agricultural or menial jobs. See Gerald D. Jaynes and Robin 
M. Williams, Jr., eds, A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society 164 (National Acad-
emy, 1989). Of those who were fortunate enough to be college graduates, preaching and 
teaching were practically the only professions open to them. Id at 165, 170. (Between 1912 
and 1938, 73% of all black college graduates became ministers or teachers. As late as 1980, 
teaching accounted for over 27% of white-collar occupations filled by African-Americans.) 
See also Paula Giddings, When and Where I Enter 101, 104-05 (Morrow, 1984) (discussing 
the role of black women teachers after the American Civil War and at the beginning of the 
twentieth century). 
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I feel that I have much more in common with the schoolteacher that 
II originally planned to be than the college and law school professors who 
taught me. Those schoolteachers were women who stayed after school 
with their special students, who sawall their students as their children, 
who worked hard and long to try to have their students both learn the 
facts and be introspective and thoughtful enough to analyze everything 
critically. These teachers pushed their students into being something 
that the students might never have thought possible for themselves. 
I believe that my impetus to teach law comes from my basic convic-
tion that most people are capable of learning a great deal, but that their 
teachers must believe that they are capable of learning in order to teach 
them properly. Many teachers, especially in law schools, do not expect 
great intellectual achievement from their students because of their own 
and American culture's narrow and limiting view of what being smart 
means and who is worthy of the designation. I now believe that helping 
others overcome the presumption that they are not smart or that their 
ideas are not worthy of consideration is the basis of more than one black 
woman's impulse to teach, especially since we have so often felt and have 
had to overcome others' presumptions about and low expectations of us. 
When I was in high school, a recruiter from the Ivy League college ]I 
eventually attended came to the guidance office to speak with prospective 
students. My best friend and I were the only two people who showed up. 
The recruiter's disappointment was written all over his face. Here he 
was, gracing my high school with his presence, and these two black girls 
were the only ones to greet him. I felt humiliated; perhaps I wasn't good 
enough to go to that school. It wasn't until the deadline that I gathered 
the courage to send my application. This man was one of a series of 
people who seemed determined to thwart my ambition, to keep me in my 
place, and to let me know that I should not be allowed into the inner 
sanctum that belonged to somebody who wasn't me. 
This same recruiter eventually conducted my alumnus interview for 
the school. I thought we had a good talk; we discussed a then-popular 
feminist novel about the school I wanted to attend. But the humiliation 
returned when he concluded the interview by telling me that I would 
never be admitted to the school. I was an interesting person, had good 
grades and good test scores, had held leadership positions in school orga-
nizations, and seemed bright enough, but I was no competition for those 
who attended more elite schools. 
When my acceptance letters arrived, from that and another ITvy 
League college, I didn't want anyone outside my family to know. IT 
thought that it was somehow shameful; I started to believe that there 
were other more deserving people who had been deprived of their place 
in the class because of me. Moreover, the possibility of eventual failure 
terrified me. Against my wishes, my best friend told everyone witTrnin 
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shouting distance about the letters of acceptance. The response was uni-
versal: no one could believe it, not even the teachers who had written my 
recommendations.4 One student said, "I didn't know you were like that, 
Odeana." When 1 asked what "like that" was, he said, "You know, 
smart." 
This concept of the smart person is one that has intrigued me ever 
since. When 1 was growing up, smart was not a word used in my house-
hold. My parents believed that learning should be enjoyable and that my 
siblings and 1 should do the best we could at whatever we did. S 1 knew 
that 1 performed better academically than many of the children in my 
all-black elementary and junior high schools, but "smart" in the Neal 
family dictionary had a broad definition. There were many ways to be 
smart: academically, musically, artistically, perhaps even in the way one 
managed to keep a house clean all the time. But by the time we moved to 
the suburbs, I saw that "smart" was not so broadly defined by the rest of 
the world. 
The smart people didn't look or act like me. They were not black, 
they were not fat, and their hair was always neat. They never cursed, 
their grammar was impeccable, and they never questioned authority. 
They took school quite seriously, made sure that everybody knew they 
took it seriously, and, most importantly, took themselves quite seriously. 
They were the ones admitted to elite colleges, not people like me. 
My failure to live up to this standard of smartness has haunted me 
for many years since and, at times, has made me question my own intelli-
gence. While teaching assistants and professors urged the smart people 
in college to apply for fellowships or scholarships, no one felt that 1 was 
worthy of consideration. The law student to whom 1 was assigned for 
pre-law advising told me that 1 should not waste my time or money 
applying to prestigious law schools: they didn't want someone like me. 
Although one of my college roommates had lived with me for four years, 
had, presumably, seen me be fairly conscientious about my coursework, 
and knew about my being admitted to Harvard Law School, she was 
surprised to find that 1 was not anxious about whether 1 would graduate 
from college with honors. "I didn't know you had grades like that," she 
said after looking at my college transcript. 
Even as a law professor, 1 know that 1 am initially viewed with skep-
ticism by many of the people 1 encounter professionally. 1 guess 1 don't 
look smart. I'm sure that my appearance conjures up more images of a 
4 In fact, one of my teachers told me before he wrote my recommendation that it would not be 
flattering. He said he would write that I was abrasive, disrespectful of adults, and immature. 
S My mother indelibly marked this idea on my psyche when I ran home from school in the 
fourth grade with straight A's on my report card. She was working in the garden and I 
excitedly showed her my grades. She said, "As long as you did the best you could," and went 
back to her gardening. 
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"mammy"6 than of a law professor. Some law professors will not believe 
that I'm capable of engaging in intellectually rigorous activities because 
most of my teaching responsibilities are clinical.7 And there will always 
be those who will assume that since my race and sex were considered 
(I'm certain) as two of the criteria for my hiring, I couldn't possibly be as 
smart as a man or a white woman who might have been hired. 8 
Many of my students are surprised when they realize that I am a 
hard grader or that I have high expectations of them. But I get much 
pleasure from those students who I think have been ignoring me all 
semester-usually white men who sit in the back of the room, look dis-
tracted, and never speak-who come to me when classes are over and say 
that they learned something, that I made them think about something 
that they had never thought about before. And I, hopefully, have made 
them rethink what it means to be smart. Still, I cannot help but hope 
that my teaching makes students think more, not only about whatever 
subject is being discussed in class on a particular day, but also about how 
they might reenvision their roles in the world. Ideally, I also help them 
find the courage to try to live what they envision. 
I do not believe that my paradigm for teaching is the norm. I work 
from the presumption that my students are capable of doing anything, 
and I expect the very best of them. I do not presume, as I think some 
have with me, that my students' sex or race, the way they look, or the 
language they use means that they are not smart.9 And I like to believe 
6 See Donald Bogle, Toms, Coons, Mulattoes. Mammies. and Bucks: An Interpretive History of 
Blacks in American Films 9 (Viking, 1989) (describing the mammy, one of five stock black 
characters in American film, as "big, fat, and cantankerous"). 
7 One clinician told me about being introduced at a faculty function. A senior member of the 
faculty approached her and another young faculty member in order to introduce them to a 
judge. Turning to the non-clinician, the senior faculty member said, "Now here's a real 
scholar." See also Committee On the Future of the In-House Clinic, Section on Clinical Legal 
Education, Association of American Law Schools, Executive Summary of the Final Report of 
the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic 5 (1990) (finding that "[uJnequal faculty 
status continues to plague clinical teachers, many of whom still function with lesser job titles, 
lower pay, and a diminished role in the governance of their law schools"); William Pincus, 
Prefatory Remarks, 29 Cleve St L Rev 348 (1980) (discussing negative attitudes towards 
clinical legal education and clinicians). 
8 People of color are often assumed not to be qualified for their positions in academia and in 
other professions. Of course, assuming that a person is not qualified for a position because her 
selection was based at least in part on race ignores the fact that academic hiring often takes 
into consideration characteristics that do not have anything to do with being qualified for the 
job. These considerations include a teaching candidate's having friends in common with those 
who do the hiring, being an alumnus or having other prior contact with the school, or being 
found to have scholarly potential based on the completion of a judicial clerkship. See Richard 
Delgado, Approach Avoidance in Law School Hiring: Is the Law a Wasp?, 34 SLU L Rev 631, 
634-36 (1990) (discussing one school's hiring procedures, which include obtaining names of 
potential candidates from other law teachers and discussing the reasons often given for not 
hiring scholars of color). 
9 See, for example, Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and 
Tenure, 103 Harv L Rev 926, 948 & n 108 (1990). In the article, the author, a colleague of 
mine, lists by qualification a number of people who did not understand text written by a 
feminist author in order to prove that the text constituted "intellectual quicksand." The pe0-
ple qualified to judge the text included someone who graduated magna cum laude from 
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that other characteristics that are supposed to create a presumption of 
intelligence do not p~vi1ege some students over others in my mind. I do 
not assume that a student who is on the law review is any more intelli-
gent than someone who is not, nor do I assume that one student whose 
grades are better than another's is smarter. I do not assume that the 
institution from which a student received her undergraduate degree 
means much of anything except to tell me where she went to college. 
Likewise, I do not assume that the fact that my students attend the Uni-
versity of Baltimore School of Law means that they aren't capable of 
being the lawyers that Harvard Law School expects its graduates to be. 
And to the degree that my students have internalized any of these 
assumptions, I try to get them to rethink their assumptions about them-
selves and others. 
One of the most difficult presumptions I must strive to overcome, 
however, is one of the primary presumptions of legal academia: that 
writing is the most significant act that someone in the profession can 
undertake, that those who write, and are published, are somehow 
smarter than those who primarily want to engage in the verbal exchange 
of ideas, or teaching. It is very rare for law professors to discuss how 
wonderfully someone teaches, although "Have you read so-and-so's arti-
cle?" is heard all the time. 
The delegitimation of verbal intellectualizing in legal academia 
begins with the way law school is taught. Students, through reading 
appellate decisions, are taught broad and abstract principles that they are 
then expected to apply to concrete situations; if they have difficulty doing 
this, they are labelled "not smart." The level of abstraction I encoun-
tered when I was a law student threw me. I couldn't relate what was 
happening in my classes to the media images of what lawyers do. 
Although I had started law school with the expectation that I would be a 
public defender after graduation, the process of learning through the 
reading of appellate decisions gave me the impression that being a trial 
lawyer was for those who were not quite up to grasping abstract princi-
ples like those in the appellate decisions I was reading-in other words, 
trying cases was for those who weren't so smart. The best lawyers were 
those who would go on to write the briefs that would lead to judicial 
Harvard, the author of nine published books, and a Rhodes Scholar. The implication was that 
if people like that did not understand the text, then it must be incomprehensible. He never 
asked me what I thought about the text; perhaps I did not possess the necessary judging 
qualities. The text made perfect sense to me, however. 
Of course, some characteristics make some people take me more seriously-make them 
believe that I'm smarter-than they otherwise would. The fact that I graduated from Harvard 
Law School gives me legitimacy that I would not otherwise have in some students' and col-
leagues' eyes; when they realize that I'm a "double-Harvard," I get even more respect. I'm 
equally sure that each new publication I create--assuming that it is at least somewhat 
cogent-will make some people pay more attention to me than they otherwise would. 
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opnruons written by the best former lawyers, which would teach futull"e 
nmwyers what kind of lawyers they should strive to be. 
n cannot believe in the privilege of the written word, however, fOll" 
what would that say about the relative importance of things that I hoM 
oea!"est in my heart, things that were taught to me by unlettered men !mOl 
'Women,1O or whispered by a lover, or giggled about on the phone with m 
friend? In spite of the notion that writing means creating lasting ideas, 
there are still so many of our traditions which persist in spite of being 
1I.llmlwritten. My friends and I joke about the invisible black mothers' 
$chool that all our mothers seem to have attended. They must have 
mUelDlooo it because all of them have told us, "You can't learn everything 
from a book," or "You always keep some money hidden away from your 
husband in case you have to get up and leave," or stories about oranges 
(always oranges!) at Christmas. 11 Are these stories less legitimate 
because they're unwritten? Are they less true? They certainly aren't less 
abiding. And what would be the effect of writing them down? Probably 
unabated scrutiny and criticism to make us believe, intellectually, tnm1t 
green, in certain circumstances, might be pink, although we will (hope-
fully) still know in our hearts that green is green. 12 
10 Many of my relatives have very little formal education. See note 3. 
II Alice Walker recognized the significance and influence of our unlettered foremothers: 
They were women then 
My mama's generation 
Husky of voice-Stout of 
Step 
With fists as well as 
Hands 












To discover books 
Desks 
A place for us 
How they knew what we 
Must know 
Without knowing a page 
Of it 
Themselves. 
Alice Walker, In Search o/Our Mothers' Gardens 24243 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 19113). 
12 Derrick Bell, Mari Matsuda, and Richard Delgado were the targets of an attempt to deny 
their truths in Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques 0/ Legal Academia, 102 Harv L Rev 174S 
(1989). In his article, Kennedy attempts to force empiricism on the lived reality of the three 
lICholars, and would thereby deny them their "deepest and nonrational knowledge." (This 
phrase comes from Audre Lorde, "Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power" in Sister Outsider 
S3 (Crossing, 1984». 
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I suspect that some of the storytelling in the new written legal schol-
arship produced by people of color is an attempt, however subconscious, 
to bridge a gap between oral traditions and written traditions. 13 Still, I 
wonder why so many scholars of color think only about how to write and 
not about what it means to write at all. I know that people choose 
academia as a career for all kinds of reasons, but I think that many peo-
ple of color now entering the profession have chosen this path because we 
believe that it will have an effect in the real world. If this is the goal of 
our writing, I believe the significance of legal scholarship is exaggerated. 
Our thoughts are rarely disseminated to the vast majority of people 
whose lives we seek to change. Instead, law teachers often speak to and 
about one another in a complicated menage. 14 One scholar has even sug-
gested that we can't talk to one another until we place ourselves within 
the context of even more abstract literary movements. IS If scholarship 
has to include both creation and dissemination to make a difference in 
the world, why is one so much more privileged than the other? How can 
our writing in legal journals, sometimes in language that is incomprehen-
sible even to us, be that important if it does not journey out into the 
world? If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it 
make a sound? If the journey is important, why does our profession fail 
to praise the messenger? 
I wanted to be a lawyer so that I could help people. At one time I 
didn't think that could be done except through front-line legal services 
work. But I think I help people now through my teaching. I help them 
by pushing them into self-examination they may not have been pushed to 
engage in before. I teach them how to "think like lawyers" and how 
13 Legal storytelling plays an important role in new legal theories undergoing creation and often 
named Critical Race Theory. See Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice 
Really Matter, 76 Va L Rev 95, 95 nl (1990) for a description of Critical Race Theory. For 
examples of storytelling in legal scholarship see Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Recon-
structing Idealsfrom Deconstructed Rights, 22 Harv CR-CL L Rev 401 (1987); Patricia Wil-
liams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Finger Pointing as the Law's Response 
to Racism, 42 U Miami L Rev 127 (1987); Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved (Basic Books, 
1984). See also Symposium on Legal Storytelling, 87 Mich L Rev 2073 (1989). 
14 For example, in The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literoture, 
Richard Delgado criticized the "inner circle" of antidiscrimination law scholars which con-
sists of "about a dozen white, male writers who comment on, take polite issue with, extol, 
criticize, and expand on each other's ideas." 132 U Pa L Rev 561, 563 (1984). Randall Ken-
nedy critiqued Delgado in Racial Critiques, 102 Harv L Rev 1745. Delgado responded to 
Kennedy in Mindset and Metaphor, 103 Harv L Rev 1872 (1990) and When a Story is Just a 
Story: Does Voice Really Matter, 76 Va L Rev 95 (1990). Finally others helped complete what 
Richard Delgado calls the "minuet," The Imperial Scholar at 563, in Colloquy-Responses to 
Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 103 Harv L Rev 1844 (1990). 
15 Such intimation was made by Kendall Thomas at a panel on Critical Race Theory, Associa-
tion of American Law Schools (Jan 6, 1991) (audiocassette on file with AALS). Thomas 
stated: 
I would hold that a critical theory of race and law cannot avoid engagement with the 
concepts that are subsumed under the labels post-structuralism and post-modernism. I 
would say further that a refusal to explore the intersection between the two must be 
overcome not because of any felt need to stay on top of the latest intellectual fashions 
but rather and more crucially because current times and realities demand it. 
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limiting thinking like a lawyer can be. I teach them how law can help 
transform the way we think about how the world works and how law 
helps foreclose some options to us. I expend much time and energy 
thinking about what and how to teach, and I feel that teaching is the 
most important of the many obligations I have as a law professor. 16 I 
refuse to believe that this desire to teach, really teach, makes me less 
smart or less deserving of my place on my faculty, even if I never pub-
lished a single word. 
! may be fooling myself by thinking that my teaching has any more 
effect in the real world than written scholarship.17 Still, even when I 
think that what I have to say in writing is worthwhile, I ask myself 
whether it is an exercise that is undertaken for my own benefit18 or 
whether it is something that will help people. I do not feel that the same 
kind of helping, the same kind of connection to other people, takes place 
with writing as takes place with teaching. 
I close with one more story. I teach a course in which my students, 
the majority of whom are black, teach law to high school students. As I 
was engaged in a performance observation and evaluation, I looked up 
and suddenly realized that I, the black teacher of two motivated and 
caring young black men, was watching them motivate, watching them 
teach, a classroom of young black men and women. And I thought, 
"Thank you, God; it doesn't get any better than this." I don't see how it 
could. 
16 The University of Baltimore School of Law Faculty Handbook (1990-1991) states: "The crite-
ria for retention, promotion, and tenure determinations are high quality classroom teaching, 
scholarly production, and service." Id at 1-1.2. 
17 Sonia Sanchez, for example, states that she writes for many of the reasons that I teach: 
I write because I must. I write because it keeps me going. I probably have not killed 
anyone in America because I write. I've maintained good controls over myseJfby writ-
ing. I also write because I think one must not only share what one thinks, or the 
conclusions one has reached, but one must also share to help others reach their conclu-
sions. Writing might help them survive. 
Sonia Sanchez, in Claudia Tate, ed, Black Women Writers at Work 142 (Continuum, 1983). 
18 In addition to written scholarship being a condition of my employment, see note 16, I must, as 
must most law professors, produce a certain amount of written legal scholarship in order to 
receive tenure at my institution. I must admit that a certain feeling of accomplishment accom-
panies the completion of an article. 
